The collapse of a filling occurred due to heavy rain in Higashi-Hiroshima City's Shiwa District at about 5:30 am July 25th, 2009. The filling was made of surplus soils, and it contained a mass of water supplied from rainfall and ground water flow of a permeable layer at the bottom of the filling. The collapsed soil flowed down and destroyed a house. In this paper, the cause of this disaster is discussed. The site of the disaster was used as the dumping site of surplus soils, after several changes of ground formation. The history of the geographical change was reconstructed by the image processing of old map, aerial photographs, result of 3-dimentional laser survey carried out after collapse and the measurement of thickness of collapsed soil by dynamic cone penetration test. According to the result of processing, the shape and the size of the filling before collapse was reconstructed. The relationship between the rainfall and the groundwater in the river sediments layer over which the filling was constructed was determined. A stability analysis of the filling was conducted considering the rise of the groundwater level in the filling and the laboratory measured strength parameters. The results of the stability analysis showed that the collapse would have taken place when the groundwater level rose by about 9 m due to the supply of groundwater through the river sediments layer.
Introduction
Landslides and mudflows are frequent natural disasters in Japan which almost always occur after heavy seasonal rainfall, causing the loss of life and property. Kitamura and Sako (2010) published a state-of-the-art review of research work on slope failure during the last 50 years. In Hiroshima Prefecture, as many as 32,000 natural slopes are considered to be susceptible to landslide and mudflow disasters. This is the highest number of the potentially dangerous among the 47 prefectures in Japan (Hiroshima Prefecture, 2010) . Landslide disasters occur frequently during seasonal rainfalls in the western part of Japan's main island, where the natural slopes are made from residual sandy soils of heavily weathered granite, called "Masado" (Aboshi and Sokobiki, 1972) . The occurrence of these failures is mainly due to the rise of the groundwater table in the slopes or the loss of the inbound shear strength of the Masado soils due to intense and continuous rainfall during a heavy rainy season (Murata and Moriwaki, 1990) . On June 29, 1999, a severe landslide and mudflow disaster in Hiroshima Prefecture resulted in the deaths of 36 people (Sasaki et al., 2001; Nakai et al., 2006) . After the "6.29 disaster", Hiroshima Prefectural Government installed an on-line rainfall measurement system which compiles information from 277 measurement stations in the prefecture. On September 7, 2005, due to the concentrated heavy rainfall in the passage of Typhoon No. 14, an embankment of Sanyo Expressway in Iwakuni City neighboring to Hiroshima Prefecture suddenly failed, resulting in the deaths of 3 residents living in 2 houses near the embankment (Murata, et al., 2009) . Slope disasters in Yamaguchi Prefecture and Kyushu area caused by Typhoon No. 14 in 2005 were reported in detail by Sehara et al. (2006) and Sezaki et al. (2006) , respectively. On July 16th, 2010, a heavy rainstorm of 173 mm (at Oto precipitation station) suddenly hit Shobara city, Hiroshima Prefecture, causing landslides and mud flows at over 200 sites in a narrow mountainous area of 4 km (Hanaoka et al., 2012) . The frequent occurrence of landslide disasters illustrates the importance of studying disaster prevention measures. In eastern Japan, natural slope failures are also frequently induced by heavy rainfall: the Niigata 13th of July, 2004 disaster is one such example (Toyota et al., 2006; Shibuya et al., 2007; JGS, 2011) . Recently, natural slopes are being closely monitored for the purpose of disaster prevention (Jeng and Lin, 2011; Rahardjo et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2012) . Case studies of actual natural slope failure will prove useful in this approach.
On July 24th, 2009, an artificial filling which was constructed in a mountainous area in Higashi-Hiroshima city in Hiroshima prefecture suddenly collapsed after heavy rainfall that lasted for 9 h. The flow of fluidized sediment reached a house located 300 m downstream from the fill and destroyed it completely, burying two persons, one of whom died and one of whom was rescued several hours after the incident. The site of the collapsed fill had been unitized as a disposal site for construction surplus soil by a company since 2004. According to the report of Japanese government (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2010) , the total volume of surplus soil discharged from construction work in 2008 was about 141 million m 3 and about 70% of the surplus soil was brought to disposal sites inland. As Hiroshima prefecture has little habitable area for its population, most of the disposal sites of surplus soil are located in mountainous areas. The company managing the collapsed fill had been filling a valley with surplus soil which was accepted for a charge per volume. The disaster was the first case in Japan that the disposal site for surplus soil collapsed due to the heavy rainfall and resulted in a fatality. After the disaster, the causes of the collapse were studied by a team at Hiroshima University and Fukken Corp . The results of the study are reported in this paper, along with a discussion about the considerations on countermeasures required to prevent similar disasters in disposal fields of surplus soil in future.
Overviews of the disaster and field investigation
According to the recorded rainfall in Hiroshima Prefecture, the prefecture received an accumulated rainfall of 151 mm over the period of 20 h from 18:00 on the 24th July, 2009, due to the influence of the active front of seasonal rain. It was continuous rainfall with a maximum intensity of 32 mm/h. Due to this rainfall, at around 5:30 on July 25th, a collapse occurred at a surplus soil disposal site in the Shiwa District in Higashi Hiroshima and the fluidized sediment flowed downstream, leading to a disaster that left one house completely destroyed, one person dead and one person injured. The site of the collapse and the area of sediment flow is shown in Fig. 1 . The district of Shiwacho in Higashi-Hiroshima city is a mountainous region. The location of the disaster is in a small area along a mountain stream etched into the northeast facing slope of a mountain terrain extending from southwest to northeast. A filling was formed using surplus soil such that it would fill a valley with the mountain stream. As will be described later, the filling was built up in several stages and was estimated to have reached a maximum height of around 30 m from the base.
From the geological map of the site, the base rock of the site was located at the boundary between the granite and rhyolite area; the granite area was downstream, and the rhyolite area was upstream. According to field investigations, most of the surface soils around the valley and the filled surplus soil seemed to be Masado, heavily weathered granite.
The location map of the surveyed areas and photographs are shown in Fig. 2 . A site reconnaissance was conducted on July 27th and August 7th, 2009, and the information obtained relating to the disaster was as follows. The downstream conditions of the collapsed and flowed soils in the vicinity of the destroyed house are shown in Photo 1. Even when a survey was conducted on August 7th, almost 2 weeks after the disaster struck, the ground was muddy underfoot to the extent that the feet would sink. It can therefore be concluded that the collapsed sediment deposit had extremely high fluidity. The sediment traveled a horizontal distance of approximately 500 m from the soil disposal site to the house and the nearby street (an elevation of approximately 100 m). The equivalent coefficient of friction (Korner, 1980) , which is the horizontal distance traveled by the soil divided by the difference in elevation, is 0.20 and it is thought that the sediment flow phenomenon during this event was mudflow. However, the observed sediments did not contain any large stones, which can often be seen in the disaster areas of mudflows where granite and rhyolite are common.
The condition of the disaster-affected house is shown in Photo 2. The house was completely destroyed by the soil that flowed downwards and the debris from the house was spread around the surrounding area. Photo 3 shows the layer of riverbed deposits downstream from the landslide fills. This layer is due to mudflows that had occurred in the past and it was found that it is almost continuously present. Even after the landslide occurred, water flowed abundantly in the layer and it is thought that, before and after the disaster struck, a large amount of groundwater was supplied from this layer.
Photo 4 shows the conditions at the top of the fill after collapse. Spring water was still flowing out from several locations on the side of the slope. This indicates that, as mentioned previously, a large amount of ground water was supplied to the inside of the fill through the layer of river bed deposits that were under the fill. Photo 5 shows the right side bank of the landslide. Although 2 weeks had passed since the collapse, spring water was discernible in the vicinity of the surveying pole. This spring water was also close to the location of the layer of river bed deposits, which was verified by the bore hole logs at the top of landslide fill, as will be discussed later. It is highly likely that the spring was supplied by this layer. It was observed that the collapsed sediment deposit included soils of different colors from the surrounding ground. Within these soils were not only natural materials, such as gravel and sand, but also man-made debris, such as fragments of asphalt and offcuts of vinyl.
From the observations of the collapse soils, it seemed that a large part of the sediments that had collapsed was surplus soil which was filled by the company since 2004 and that, after the surplus soil had collapsed, it flowed downwards scraping against the side of the slope and incorporating soil from the ground along the way.
A field investigation and an interview with the company responsible for the fill since 2004 and the governmental agency on erosion control, it was known that there were almost no records for the filling in this valley except for the aerial photographs taken in 1981. In 1981, the upper part of the collapsed fill were already constructed for the purpose of the forest road construction. From 1981 to 2009, two major filling works were made for the construction of a waste disposal site and for a filling for surplus soil. In this study, to find the reason of this disaster, the topographic changes were estimated using various approaches.
3. Estimation of past topographic change of disaster area 3.1. Topography and geomorphology of the area As shown in Fig. 2 , the upstream catchment area of the valley where the filling is located is 33,200 m 2 , and the topography shows that the rain that falls upstream gathers easily in the valley where the collapse occurred. Furthermore, near the top of the filling, there is a forest road crossing the mountain stream and it is thought that rainfall water gathered easily into the valley through the forest road.
Approximately 100 m downstream from the collapsed filling, the valley becomes wider and a gently sloping topography with a gradient of around 101. It is thought that this topography is formed by the accumulation of colluvium deposits and mudflow deposits from years back and is widely distributed in the foothills of surrounding areas, including this area.
According to the 1/50,000 geological survey map (Takagi and Mizuno, 1999) , "Kaita quadrangle", the bedrock geology of this area is granite or rhyolite, upon which unconsolidated sediment is distributed. In the lower reaches, a Hiroshima graphite bedrock geology is distributed and in the upper reaches a rhyolite Takeda bedrock geology is distributed and these are fault-contacted. Small rocks of fine-grained granite have also been presented in the vicinity of the geological boundary. A distribution of ancient talus (mudflow) sediments and a substantial upper terrace layer was recorded on top of the bedrock and the aforementioned gentle topography is thought to correspond to these distribution ranges. Furthermore, the river bed deposits are thought to have been distributed so that they fill the valley channel, but some of these deposits were washed away together with the downward flowing sediment.
During the site reconnaissance, the distribution of talus and mudflow sediments with a well-compacted matrix were apparent in the locations scoured by the discharged sediment and following that the water flow, as shown in Photo 6, and these are thought to correspond to the ancient talus. Furthermore, deposits that contained rounded gravel, thought to be the substantial upper terrace layer, were also verified in parts. The filling was made up of sediment that contains fine-grain fractions, and the sediment deposits contained an extremely large amount of water after the collapse. The top of the filling, which corresponds to the head of the collapse, was relatively well-compacted, resulting in a steep slope.
Change of landscape of the disaster site
The site was used as a surplus soil disposal site, but it was designed as an industrial waste disposal facility, which was abandoned and unused after construction. The prefectural government authorized the installation of an industrial waste disposal facility which a company applied for in 1992. From 1992 to 1994, the company constructed the retaining wall and retention pond, and they also excavated the slope at the upstream of the retaining wall and laid the impermeable rubber sheets. Photo 7 taken in 1993 shows that the rubber sheets were laid in an area from the retaining wall to 60 m upstream of the retaining wall. A sand layer cover was laid on the rubber sheets. In 1994, the government notified the company that, in the results of the survey prior to use of the facility, the facility did not satisfy the technical standards and, as a result, the company abandoned the use and the official notification of abolishment was submitted on March 31, 1995. Since 2004, the site was used as a surplus soil disposal site by another company and filling had been made and extended such that it would fill the valley channel.
Restoration of the land-forming process from the aerial photographs and measurement results
This disaster was a collapse of a filling in a surplus soil disposal site in a mountainous area. In order to investigate the cause of the collapse, it was necessary to know the topography conditions prior to the collapse, including the size and shape of the filling. However, the site of the disaster has been subject to several topographic changes due to past construction work, including a forest road and industrial waste disposal facility, since 1980s. Furthermore, as the surplus soil had been transported to the top of the filling by a forest road and was disposed by piling it in the bottom of the valley from the top of the filling since 2004, the size and shape of the filling changed with time. Although some data on the time history of accepted surplus soil was obtained by an interview with the manager of the company, they did not sufficiently match the volume of collapsed soil which was estimated from the field investigation after the collapse. To restore the land-forming process, a comparative study was carried out using the laser survey results after the collapse, the survey drawing submitted to the government in 1992, and the aerial photographs of the site after 1992, and a 3-dimensional image processing technique was used to display the topography changes of the collapsed filling with time. It is known that there is a margin of error of several meters concerning the altitude of mountainous areas taken from aerial photographs. The data on the collapsed soil which was taken from the aerial photographs was compared with the thickness of the collapsed soil measured by 3D laser survey and the lightweight dynamic cone penetration test (LWDCPT) mentioned later. The absolute values for the altitude were adjusted for the both data to fit together.
The following survey maps and the aerial photographs were used for the processing:
(1) Digital mapping made in this study using the aerial photographs from 1981. (Fig. 6 ), the filling of surplus soil was carried out further and as the slope became higher, the edge of the filling reached slightly downstream. Furthermore, an outflow of sediment to the bottom of the slope (upstream from the retaining wall) was noted and this is thought to be due to erosion and small collapses caused by rainfall.
The yellow contour drawn in the aerial photograph from 2008 in Fig. 6 is a superimposed traced contour of the collapsed sediment deposit from the aerial photograph taken after the collapse in 2009 (Fig. 7) . It can be seen from this figure that at both sides of the surface of collapse include the areas where vegetation is thick. Fig. 8 shows the estimated topographical transition of the site from 1992 to after the collapse as birds-eye view in a west to east direction. After 1999, the rubber sheets which were laid on the surface and at the bottom of the valley are visible. Using the results, the volume of collapsed soil was calculated, and the calculated volume was compared with the volume calculated from the area and the thickness of collapsed soil, which was measured by the field investigation as mentioned later. Finally it was concluded that the total volume of collapsed soil was approximately 7000 m 3 . Fig. 9 is a superimposition of a series of profiles created based on Figs. 3-7. As can be seen from Fig. 8 , the collapsed soil was mainly due to the collapse of the filling constructed from surplus soil brought in after 2004, containing part of the filling constructed between 1992 and 1999 and part of the natural slope. It was known that the embankment before 1992 did not collapse. This information is crucial when considering the cause of the collapse.
It can be concluded that the image processing technique using the past and after-collapse survey maps and the aerial photographs are useful to estimate the initial condition of collapsed slopes for engineers and it was also useful when presenting an explanation of the disaster to the public.
Geotechnical investigation

In-situ penetration test by LWDCPT
The authors have been developing a method to estimate the in-situ shear strength of natural slopes using the penetration resistance obtained by Lightweight dynamic cone penetration test (LWDCPT) (Athapaththu et al., 2007a (Athapaththu et al., , 2007b Tsuchida et al., 2011) . To determine the thickness and volume of collapsed soil by discriminating the collapsed soil from the original ground, a series of LWDCPT was carried out at the site of embankment after collapse, the sites of deposits of collapsed soil and the site without deposits near the slope. The test dates were from August 29th to September 4th in 2009, about 40 days after the collapse. LWDCPT is a dynamic cone penetrometer with variable energy, it was designed and developed in France during the 1990s (Langton, 1999) . The schematic view of the LWDCPT is shown in Fig.10 . It weighs 20 kg and can be operated by one person at almost any location to a depth of 6 m. It mainly consists of an anvil with a strain gauge bridge, a central acquisition unit, and a dialog terminal. The hammer is a rebound-type hammer and weighs 1.73 kg. The stainless steel rods are 14 mm in diameter and 0.5 m in length. Cones of 2, 4, and 10 cm 2 in area are available. The blow from the hammer to the anvil provides energy input, and a unique microprocessor records the speed of the hammer and the depth of penetration. The dynamic cone resistance (q d ) is automatically calculated from the modified form of the Dutch Formula as (Cassan, 1988) 
where x ¼ penetration due to one blow of the hammer (m), A ¼ area of the cone (m 2 ), M ¼ mass of the striking part (hammer) (kg) P ¼ mass of the struck part (head, cone, and rod) (kg) V ¼ speed of the hammer impact (m/s) With every 50 cm penetration, another stainless steel rod was joined to the rod, and the penetration test was continued to the depth where measured value of q d is greater than 10 MPa for the third time in a row. LWDCPT were carried out at 25 points, including at the embankment of the surplus soil after collapse, at the area of the deposits of collapsed and transported soil and at an area without any collapsed soil. To carry out a direct shear test, disturbed soil samples were taken at the slope after the collapse. Fig. 11 shows the measurement points of LWDCPT and the points of soil sampling. Fig. 12(a) shows the results of LWDCPT carried out at point m-9, the site of embankment after collapse, m-3.5, the site of deposit of collapsed soil, r-m-2, the site in the trees where the collapsed soil deposited, and r-12, the site 50 m far from the enclosing bund. As the soils were dried by sunny weather after the collapse, the degree of saturation was 60-80%. As shown in Fig. 12(a) , the penetration resistances q d of embankment after the collapse were larger than 2 MPa and increased with depth, which means the embankment had sufficient shear strength before the rainfall. As shown in Fig. 12(b) , there was a rubber sheet at the 1.7 m and a covering sand on the rubber sheet at the 1.4 m depth of point m-3-5. There were deposits before collapse on the covering layer by about 70 cm and the soil from collapsed embankment remained on the deposits before collapse. Before the geotechnical investigation of the site, the possibility that the rubber sheets, which were laid for the unused waste disposal site, were related to the landslide or the flow of collapsed soil was discussed. Fig. 12 (b) showed that the sliding or the movement of collapsed soil did not take place at the surface of the rubber sheet, and that the rubber sheets were not related to the disaster.
Looking at Fig. 12(b)-(d) , the q d showed the constant value of 0.2-1.0 MPa from the surface to the 60 cm depth, and q d was clearly larger in the depth more than 60 cm. The surface layer of 60 cm thickness seemed to be the deposits of soil from collapsed embankment. The value of q d showed variation because the q d becomes larger when the cone hits the gravel or root in the ground. However, the minimum values of q d did not considerably vary and were 0.1-0.3 MPa, and showed no relationship with the depth. The discrimination of the deposited layer of collapsed soil was carried out using the relationship between the minimum of q d and the depth. Table 1 shows the thickness of the layer of collapsed soil deposits at each measurement points. As shown in the table, the maximum thickness was 1.6 m above the enclosing bund and 0.81 m below the enclosing bund. The estimated thickness of the collapsed soil in Table 1 was used to estimate the volume of collapsed soil together with the image processing results. 
Physical properties of collapsed soil
As mentioned above, the embankment made by construction surplus soil collapsed and the collapsed soil was transported along the valley. The disturbed soil samples of the embankment which remained after the collapse were taken from a depth of 30 cm at the points m-6, m-7 and m-9 in Fig. 11 . According to the observation of soil samples, the embankment was constructed by two kinds of soil, black soil (Sample A) and brown soil (Sample B). The physical properties of the soil samples were listed in Table 2 . The gradation curves of the samples were shown in Fig. 13 , where the gradation characteristics of both soil samples was similar and the fine contents were 27-28%.
Measurement of strength parameters of collapsed soil
A direct shear test of the sampled soils were carried out after adjusting the void ratio to that of the in-situ average value and the degree of saturation of 70%. All tests were conducted at 39.2, 78.4 and 156.8 kPa normal stresses. Shearing was achieved by horizontally displacing the bottom half of the direct shear box relative to the top half at a constant shear displacement rate of 0.2 mm/min, as described in JGS 0561-200 (Japanese Geotechnical Society, 2000) . Although the drainage was permitted at the upper loading plate, it is considered that the sample was sheared almost under the constant water content condition (Fredlund and Rahardjo, 1993; Tsuchida et al., 2011).
Figs. 14(a) and 14(b) show the result of the direct shear test of black soil and brown soil, respectively, in which the frictional angle and the cohesion at the peak and the residual condition were plotted. The apparent frictional angle in drained condition ϕ d and apparent cohesion in drained condition c d are shown in Fig. 14 . The values of ϕ d and c d at peak strength were 36.4-37.11 and 7.4-13.4 kPa, respectively, and the values of ϕ d and c d at the residual condition were 35.7-36.41and 4.9-11.0 kPa, respectively.
It was considered that as collapsed fill was just piled up without any controlled compaction, the safety of the fill would be determined by the weak part. Therefore, taking the lowest values of the result of shear test, the strength parameters of the collapsed fill for stability analysis were determined as 
where q d5 the corrected penetration resistance at the overburden pressure is 5 kPa. Using the q d shown in Fig. 12 , the average q d value at point m-9, non-collapsed fill at 0-1 m depth was about 1.75 and the measured degree of saturation was 60.4%. The strength parameter calculated by Eqs. (2)- (4) were ϕ d ==39.11 and c d =8.7 kPa, which were slightly larger than the results of direct shear of remolded samples with the same void ratio as that of the site.
Rainfall and groundwater
Record of rainfall
Hiroshima Prefecture government has installed an on-line rainfall measurement system covering 277 measurement stations in the prefecture. Fig. 15 shows the location of rain gauges in the vicinity of the disaster area. Fig. 16(a) and (b) and Fig. 17(a) and (b) show the accumulated rainfall and hourly rainfall from June 27th to July 31st and from July 24th to 25th at the rain gauges of Shino Station and Zouga Station, respectively. In Shino Station, the accumulated rainfall from July 23rd was 151 mm and the maximum rainfall intensity per hour was 32 mm/h, and in Zouga Point the accumulated rainfall was 173 mm and the maximum rainfall intensity per hour was 37 mm/h. The collapse took place at 5:30 am of July 25th 2-3 h after strong rainfall from 21:00 pm on the 24th to 3:00 am on the 25th. This suggests that the cause of collapse might be related not only to the rainfall but also the underground water which flowed into the slope through the river bed deposits below the slope since it would take some time for the water in the catchment area to flow into the fill.
As shown in Figs. 16 and 17 , there was continuous seasonal rainfall from June 29th to July 2nd, from July 8th to the 10th, and from July 17th to the 21st before the collapse, and the accumulate rainfall from June 29th reached 600 mm in less than 1 month, the maximum accumulative rainfall from the start of a series of rainfalls since 1999. Accordingly, the water content of the soil near the collapsed slope was increased by the earlier rainfalls, making the potential risk of slope failure higher. 
Measurement of groundwater level after collapse
From a field investigation and boring at the top of the collapse fill, it was known that there is a river bed deposits layer below the fill of surplus soil. The river bed deposits layer was considered to be deposited in the past mudflow in this valley, and consists of coarse grained soil classified into rock or gravel. Because the permeability of the river bed deposits layer is rather high and the water flow in this layer was observed in the field investigation on 7th August, 2 weeks after the collapse, it was estimated that groundwater flow would have been provided to the layer in the case of strong rainfall. To investigate the groundwater flow in the collapsed fill, a boring was carried out at the top of the fill (the location is shown in Fig. 11) , and the measurement of the groundwater level was carried out from August 25th to the end of October, utilizing the bore hole. Fig. 18 shows the STP-N value-depth relationship of the bore hole. From the SPT and the bore hole logs shown in Fig. 18 , the thickness of the fill by the surplus soil was about 9 m and there was a river bed deposit layer of 4 m thickness below the fill. Fig. 19 shows the measured groundwater level and the rainfall intensity per hour at the Shino, Shiwa and Higashi-Hiroshima Stations. As shown in the figure, a significant rise of groundwater level was measured twice during the observation period. One was on September 4th and the other was on October 2nd. Fig. 20 shows the relationship between rainfall and the change in the groundwater level on September 4th. As shown in the figure, although the rainfall period was short, the groundwater level rose quickly and peaked at about 2 h after the rainfall stopped. Less rain fell on September 4th than on October 2nd, according to the rise in groundwater levels. Though the reason remains unclear, it may be that the local rain at the site was larger than the observed rainfalls. Fig. 21 shows the relationship between rainfall and the change in the groundwater level on October 2nd. As shown in the figures, the rainfall intensity per hour showed two or three peaks, while the groundwater level showed two peaks several hours after the rainfall peak. These records suggest that the groundwater in the fill rises several hours later after the rainfall due to the supply of water from the catchment, and that the rise in the groundwater level in the fill due to the supply of groundwater was a major cause of the disaster.
Slope stability analyses
Strength parameter of soil
A two dimensional slope stability analysis was carried out by circular slip with slices in order to understand the causative mechanism of the collapse of the fill. A computer program for the circular slip was used to search for the minimum safety factor. The calculation method employed was Fellenius's method, because it is this method that is adopted in the technical standards for infrastructures, such as highway bridges, riverdikes and dams. The cross sections for analyses were constructed from the restored historical change of cross section shown in Fig. 9 . Fig. 22 shows the estimated cross section just before the collapse. As mentioned before, it was known from the analysis of aerial photograph and the survey that the collapse took place in the fill after 1992, which was above the ground surface in 1992 in Fig. 8 . "Filling after 1992" in Fig. 22 consists of the embankment, which was constructed for road of industrial waste disposal site before 1999 and the fill made by surplus soil after 2004. However, as it was difficult to discriminate the embankment and the fill from the q d -depth relationship, the same strength parameters were used in the stability analysis. Table 3 shows the list of the parameters used in the stability analysis, where the parameters for the bed rock, old talus, river bed deposits and embankment before 1992 were determined after referring to the documents for design ( Nishi-Nippon Express Highway, 2007 . According to Tsuchida et al. (2011) , the apparent frictional angle of Masado is not affected by the degree of saturation, while the apparent cohesion is reduced by the increase of degree of saturation due to the loss of suction. As the apparent cohesion, 5 kPa of "filling after 1992" was obtained when the S r was 70%, the reduction due to the increase of S r should be taken into consideration. However, considering that the soil sample was reconstituted in the laboratory and the difference between the values estimated by LWDCPT, the reduction of cohesion was not considered in the analysis. The cohesion of 5 kPa for "filling after 1992" was smaller than the cohesion of 10 kPa "filling before 1992". The cohesion of 10 kPa and ϕ d of 40.01 were taken from the design manual of Nishi-Nippon Express Highway (Nishi-Nippon Express Highway, 2007) as the strength parameters of Masado fills which were constructed with the usual manner. As it was estimated the filling before 1992 were made as part of a construction work of the forest road, the above strength parameters were used. The filling after 1992 was mainly for the purpose of disposing of surplus soil and no controlled compaction was carried out. The difference between the filling before 1992 and after 1992 was due to the construction method.
Stability analysis for the ordinary groundwater level
It is considered that in ordinary rainfall conditions, the groundwater flows in the river bed deposits layer. For the ordinary condition of groundwater, a slope stability analysis was carried out for the cross section before the collapse. Considering the shape of the sliding surface based on the measured ground surface, both a circle sliding surface and a coupled sliding surface consisting of a circle and a straight line are assumed. Fig. 23 showed the result of the analysis, where the minimum safety factor 1.491 was obtained at the top of the fill, and in the case of coupled sliding surface, the minimum safety factor was 1.600. It can be said that the fill was safe enough when the groundwater level was in the river bed deposits. From Fig. 23 , it can be seen that the spring water, as observed after the collapse (Photo 5), was located much higher than the ordinary level of groundwater.
Slope stability analysis at the rise of groundwater level
The safety factors for a coupled sliding surface were calculated assuming the rise of groundwater level, which was made by the supply of groundwater through the river bed deposits layer. Fig. 24 shows the relationship between the assumed rise of the groundwater level and the safety factor. Here the groundwater level is assumed to simply have risen parallel to the ordinary level, although the groundwater level at the toe of filling influences the shape of the sliding surface. As shown in the figure, when the groundwater level rose by 9 m, the safety factor became less than 1.0. The rise of 9 m was coincident with the evidence of spring water from the fill shown in Photo 5, taken during the field investigation. Fig. 25 showed the sliding surfaces with both circular slip and coupled sliding surfaces, assuming a 9 m rise in the groundwater. As shown in the figure, the safety factors for a large scale slide were 0.935 for the circular slip and 0.966 for the coupled sliding surface, respectively. The pursued minimum safety factor with circular slip was 0.476 at the foot of the fill, which means that the small scale slide took place at the foot and the failure of the fill occurred progressively from the foot to the top of fill. slope increasing the soil mass, making the safety factor at the time of heavy rain much smaller.
Results and discussions
Considering the results of field investigation, the reconstruction of the land-forming process from the aerial photographs and measurements, the stability analysis, the causes and the mechanism of the collapse of the fill and the long-distance flow of the collapse soils are summarized as follows:
Permeable layer with a large area of catchment: The filling for construction of the waste disposal site and the filling by the surplus soils had been made on the river bed deposits. River bed deposits consisting of coarse sands, gravels and cobbles are well permeable layer and have a large catchment topographically. The relationship between the rainfall and the rise of groundwater table was suggested by comparing the measured groundwater level with the observed rainfall near the site after the collapse.
Heavy and continued rainfall: The accumulated rainfall in July 2009 at Shino and Zouga Stations were 481 mm and 545 mm, respectively, which was the largest since 1999, the year of 6.29 disaster. Due to the intermittent rainfall at the site of disaster for almost 1 month, it was estimated that the degree of saturation of the collapsed fill and the surrounding slopes in the catchment was increased. Due to the heavy rainfall on the 24th of July, a large amount of groundwater was supplied to the fill, making the level of ground water rise by as much as about 9 m from its ordinary height.
Expansion of fill by surplus soils after 2004 without any consideration for geotechnical safety: Since 2004, a large volume of construction surplus soil accepted for a fee by a company was added to the existing fill, expanding the steep slope, and without any installation of drainage facilities. The results of slope stability analysis showed that a large scale slide would not have occurred without the addition to the fill between 2004 and 2009, even if the level of groundwater had risen by 9 m from its ordinary level.
Mechanism of collapse: When the ground water level was in the river bed deposits as the ordinary condition, the minimum safety factor of the slope was about 1.5. Due to the heavy rain and the groundwater supplied from the catchment, the ground water level in the fill rose and the safety factor was reduced.
The collapse took place from the foot of the slope and progressed to the top of the slope, rinsing the groundwater level. When the height of the ground water was about 9 m higher than its ordinary level, large scale sliding took place. It should be noted that if drainage facilities had been installed in the fill, the collapse might have been avoided by preventing the rise of the ground water level.
Long distance flow of collapsed soil: From the field investigation, the collapsed soil soon filled the inside space of the retaining wall which had been constructed as a facility of the waste disposal site, and flowed out over the wall. The surface of the accumulated soil inside the retaining wall was flat, (a 3-degree inclination), showing that the collapsed soil was almost fluidized with no frictional resistance. It is considered that a large volume of water was supplied through the river bed deposits, as well as from rainfall, will result in a high water content of collapse soils, making it possible for them to have long distance flow movement.
Insufficient government control: Hiroshima Prefectural Government had an ordinance to control the disposal sites of surplus soils. According to the ordinance, any company managing a disposal site larger than 2000 m 2 must notify the appropriate government office, and report the nature of its business and the specifications of the disposal site, so that the government could monitor the safety of the site. However, as the area of the site before the disaster was slightly less than 2000 m 2 , no legal regulation was applied to the site. As a result, the topographical change of the filling was left uncontrolled before the occurrence of the fatal disaster. Considering that most of the surplus soil disposal sites in Hiroshima Prefecture are located in mountainous areas, the limit to areas of 2000 m 2 plus was too lax from a geotechnical point of view. After this disaster, Hiroshima Prefectural Government published and enforced the technical requirements on safety measures to all the administrators of disposal sites of surplus soil and strengthened the system of surveillance.
Conclusions
The collapse of a slope occurred due to heavy rain in Higashi-Hiroshima City's Shiwa District at about 5:30 am July 25th, 2009. The slope was made of surplus soils, and it contained a mass of water supplied from rainfall and ground water flow of a permeable layer at the bottom. The collapsed soil was fluidized and flowed downstream and destroyed a house. The disaster is the first case in Japan of a disposal site for surplus soil collapsing due to heavy rainfall and resulting in a fatal accident. After the event, a detailed investigation was conducted of this failure in order to find the cause and mechanism of the failure. From the field studies, laboratory soil tests, slope stability analysis and the laboratory model tests, the following conclusions were obtained:
1) The collapsed fill was the disposal site of surplus soil, located in a valley. As the company managing the site did not have sufficient records of the accepted soil or for the process of filling, there was almost no available data on the collapsed fill. To reconstruct the shape of the fill before the collapse, the history of the geographical changes was analyzed by using old map, image processing of aerial photographs, 3-dimentional laser survey after the collapse and the measurement of thickness of collapsed soils by a dynamic cone penetration test. It was known that the fill expanded by the filling of surplus soil after 2004 and the estimated volume of fills of surplus soil was 7000 m 3 . In the filling, no drainage facility was installed and no compaction was made. 2) Downstream from the collapsed fill, there were rubber sheets which were laid for the unused waste disposal site. By the geotechnical investigation with the lightweight penetration test, it was found that no sliding or movement of the collapsed soil took place at the surface of the rubber sheet and the rubber sheets were not related to the disaster. 3) The filling for construction of the waste disposal site and the filling by the surplus soils had been made on the river bed deposits layer, consisting of coarse sands, gravels and cobblestones. The river bed deposits layer have a large catchment topographically, and it was confirmed that the height of groundwater table rose several hours later after the strong rainfall by observation using a bore hole at the top of the filling. 4) Due to the intermittent rainfall at the site of disaster for almost 1 month, it was estimated that the degree of saturation of the collapsed fill and the surrounding slopes in the catchment increased. Due to the heavy rainfall on the 24th of July, a large amount of groundwater was supplied to the filling. Judging from the location of spring water observed in the field investigation after the collapse, the level of ground water had risen by as much as about 9 m. 5) The collapsed soil filled the inside of the retaining wall which had been constructed as a facility of waste disposal site shortly, flowed out over the retaining wall and finally reached a house located 500 m downstream from the fill, and destroyed it completely. The collapsed soil was almost fluidized and had no frictional resistance. It is considered that the supply of the large volume of water through the river bed deposits, as well as the rainfall, results in a high water content of collapsed soils, and consequently long distance flow movement. 6) When the ground water level was within the river bed deposits, the minimum safety factor of the slope was about 1.5. Due to the heavy rain and the groundwater supplied from the catchment, the ground water level in the fill rose and the safety factor was reduced. The collapse took place from the foot of the slope and progressed to the top of the slope with rinsing of the groundwater level. When the level of ground water reached to about 9 m higher than the ordinary level which is the top of the river bed deposits, a large scale sliding took place. The rise of 9 m was coincided with occurrence of spring waters observed in the field investigation. 7) A large volume of construction surplus soil was filled on the existing fill since 2004, making the expanded steep slope. The filling had been carried out without the installation of drainage facilities. The results of slope stability analysis showed that no large scale slide would have occured had nothing been added to the fill between 2004 and 2009, even if the level of groundwater had risen by 9 m from its ordinary level.. 8) The disaster was the first case in Japan that the disposal site for surplus soil collapsed due to the heavy rainfall and resulted in a fatal accident. The geographical shape of slope before failure made this problem worse, and the volume of the collapsed soil was unclear and no records of the disposals were kept due to poor management. In this study, the mechanism of failure could be explained by use of image processing of aerial photographs, field tests by dynamic cone penetration test and the measurement of groundwater level -rainfall relation after the failure. It seems that these techniques used in this study are available for investigation of natural slope disasters. 9) One of the causes of the disaster was that in Hiroshima Prefecture's ordinance to control the disposal sites of surplus soils, only sites with an area of more than 2000 m 2 were covered, and no legal regulation was applied to the site less than 2000 m 2 . Considering that, the most of disposal sites of surplus soil locate in the mountainous area, the ordinance was not sufficient from a geotechnical point of view. After this disaster, Hiroshima Prefectural Government published and enforced the technical requirements on safety measures to all the administrators of disposal sites of surplus soil and strengthened the system of surveillance.
